The effect of formal credit on output and employment in rural India by Khandker, Shahidur R. & Binswanger, Hans P.
Policy,  Planning,  and Reserch
WORKING  PAPERS
Women  In Development
Population  and Human  Resources
Department





on Output and Employment
in Rural India
Shahidur  R. Khandker
and
Hans  P. Binswanger
Improving credit in rural India greatly improves rural nonfarm
employment and output. It has only a modest effect on crop out-
put - more because of increased use of fertilizer than because
of capital investments, which merely substitute for farm labor.
The Policy, Planning, and Research Conplex  distributes PPR Woiking Papers to disseminate the findings of work in progress and to
encourage the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and all others intercsF..d  in development issues. These papers carry the names of
the authors, reflect only theii views, and should be used and cited accordingly.  he findings, interpretations. and conclusions are the
















































































































dPolay  nning, and Reuach
Women  In Development
Using a two-stage model to distinguish demand  Credit decreases farm employment, yet
for formal credit from supply, Khandker and  increases the real agricultural wage because of
Binswanger conclude that increased formal  its overwhelmingly positive effect on rural
credit has a positive effect on crop production,  nonfarm employment.
on the use of fertilizer, and on private invest-
ment in machines and livestock.  In short, improved financial intermediation
in rural India greatly improves rural nonfarm
The effect of expanded credit on crop output  employment and output, has a modest effect on
is small, however. Crop output improves more  crop output, and tends to substitute capital
because of increased use of fertilizer than  investment for farm labor.
because of capital investments, which merely
substitute for labor.
This paper is a product of the Women in Development Division, Population and
Human Resources Department. Copies  are available free from the World Bank, 1818
H Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact Belinda Smith, room S9-125,
extension 35108 (28 pages with tables).
The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the rmdings  of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Planning, and Research
Complex. An objective of the series is to get these ftndings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank.
Produced at the PPR Dissemination CenterThe Effect of Formal  Credit
on Output  and  Employment  in Rural  India
by
Shahidur  R  Khandker
and
Hans  P. Blnswanger
Table  of Contents
I.  Introduction  3
II.  An  Econometric  Framework  6
III.  Data  and  Variable  Description  10
IV.  The Results  12




Gover=cent  financial  intermediation  in rural  economies  is geared
to  mobilize  rural  savings  and  foster  agricultural  output  and  invertment  via
lending. There  is  a growing  body  of literature  that  has  focused  on the
linkages  between  credit  market  development  and  economic  growth,  the  role  of
financial  institutions  in savings  mobilization  and  the  effect  of credit  on
agricultural  investment  and  output  (Braverman  and  Guasch,  1986;  David  and
Heyer,  1980;  Feder  et  al.,  1988;  Giovannini,  1985;  Gold*mith,  1969;  Gupta,
1987;  Tqbal,  1986;  Shaw,  1973;  Von  Pischke  et al.,  1983).
Credit  can  play  an  important  role  in  agriculture.  Because  farmers
often  suffer  from  a  cash-flow  problem,  their  liquidity  constraint  produces
sub-optimal  inputs  use  and  hence  output. The  role  of  credit,  therefore,  is
to bring  the  sub-optimal  outcome  to  optimal'  level  and  enhance  farmer
investment  and  output. Government  credit  institutions  often  grant  larger
volumes  of credit  for  longer  terms  and  at lower  interest  rates  than  the
informal  market. For  examle,  according  to  Reserve  Bank  of India  (RBI),  a
sum  of Rupees  101.3  billion  was advanced  to  the  rural  sector  of India  by
formal  lending  agencies  in  1980/81,  about  78  percent  increase  compared  to
the  amount  advanced  in 1969/70.  In  subs!dizing  the  growth  of  an
institutional  credit  program  for  agriculture,  the  policy  makers  face  the
questi.on:  to  what extent  formal  credit  contributes  to agricultural
investment  and  output  and  consequently  rural  employment  and  wages.- 49  -
This  paper  estimates  the  output,  investment,  employment  and  wage
effect  of institutional  credit  using  district-level  panel  data from  India.
The  central  problem  of estimating  the  causal  relationships  is  how  to
disentangle  the  aggregate  demand  for  credit  from  its  supply. What  we
observe  here is  only  a total  amount  of credit  advanced  by different
government  lending  agencies. This  amount  represents  both the  demand  for
and supply  of institutional  credit. However,  identification  of the  effects
of exogenous  increases  in credit  supply  is  critical. There  is an
additional  simultaneity  problem:  credit  demand,  output  supply,  and  farmer
investment  are  jointly  determined  in the  farmer's  utility  maximization.
In an  earlier  paper  (Binswanger,  Khandker  and  Rosenzweig,  1988)  we
circumvented  the  issue  of simultaneity  of credit  demand  and  supply  by
estimating  the  effect  of the  number  of rural  commercial  bank  branches  on
agricu'tural  output  and investment  rather  than  the  effect  of the  volume  of
credit. Because  the  growth  of rural  commercial  bank  branches  is controlled
entirely  by the  banks  and  public  policy,  it is  exogenous  to the  credit
demand  of farmers. Our  findings  suggested  that  commercial  bank  expansion
had significant  positive  effects  on farmer's  fixed  investment,  fertilizer
demand  and  output  but the  input  effect  is stronger  than  the  output  effects.
Commercial  banks  also  increase  agricultural  wage and  helps  reduce  the
incidence  of rural  poverty. However,  because  banks  promote  private  capital
investment  in agriculture  that  replaces  farm  labor,  the  positive  wage
effect  of improved  financial  intermediation  is  due  to its  strong  (positive)
effect  on rural  nonfarm  employment  and  output  (Khandker,  1989).-5-
The  commercial  banks  (CB)  are,  however,  not the  only  agencies  that
advance  credit  to agriculture.  Agencies  such  as the  Primary  Agricultural
Co-operative  Societies  (PACS)  and  the  Land  Development  Banks  (LDBs)  also
provide  credit  to Indian  farmers. 1 The  earlier  paper  could  not estimate
the  direct  effect  of the  PACS  and  the  LDBs  on  output  and  investment  as the
growth  of PACS  and  LDBs,  unlike  CBs,  does  not  measure  the  level  of their
operations. This  is because  in  recent  years  while  their  lending  has
increased  their  numbers  have been  declining  as smaller  societies  or
branches  have  been  merged. The  question  thus  emerges:  do  our findings
differ  if  we estimate  the  direct  effect  of total  formal  credit  advanced  to
the  ural  sector?
This  paper  addresses  this  issue. To identify  the  credit  supply
from  its  demand,  the  number  of rural  branches  of  CBs,  PACS,  LDBs  and
Central  Coperative  branches  (CCBs)  are  used  as instruments  to predict  the
volume  of credit  advanced. The  predicted  volume  of credit  is  then  used in
the  second  stage  of a two-stage  procedure  to estimate  the  effect  of the
volume  of institutional  credit  on agricultural  investment  and  output.
Although  the  number  of PACS  may be  negatively  related  to the  volume  of
total  lending,  the  purpose  essentially  here is  to exploit  the  presence  of
correlation  between  the  exogenous  and  the  predicted  variables.
The  paper  is structured  in the  following  manner. Section  two
discusses  the  model  framework  and  its  estimation  technique. Section  three
discusses  the  data.  Section  four  reports  the  results. Finally,  the
results  are  summarized  in the  concluding  section  of the  paper.II.  An Econometric  Framework
Additional  credit  supply  can  raise  output,  input  use,  and  hence
investment,  employment  and  wages  when the  farmer  faces  a credit  constraint.
This is  the  liquidity  effect  of credit. Credit  has  another  role  to play.
In  moat developing  countries  where  agriculture  still  remains  a risky
activity,  better  credit  facilities,  by enabling  the  smoothing  of
consumption,  can  increase  the  willingness  of farmers  to  take risk  and  hence
increase  agricultural  investment,  output,  employment  and  wages.  This  is
the  consumption  smoothing  effect  of credit. Thus,  better  rural  credit
markets  may lead  to a  volume  of agricultural  investment  and  output  and
consequently  rural  employment  and  wages  which  may  not  be attainable  with a
less  developed  or less  efficient  credit  system.
The informal  credit  sector  consisting  of a large  professional
money  lenders,  commission  agents,  traders,  relatives  and  friends  plays  an
important  role  in  rural  India  (Timberg  and  Aiyer,  1984). However,  with the
growth  of  formal  credit  market  development,  the  importance  of the  private
lending  has  reduced.  According  to  All  India  Debt  and  Investment  Survey,
the  proportion  of  farmers'  cash  debt  from  formal  sources  rose  from  18  in
1961  to 32  percent  in 1971. In contrast,  the  proportion  of loan  fron  rural
money  lenders  has  declined  from  83 to 36  percent  over  this  period.
Although  Indian  official  statistics  provide  district-level  information  on
institutional  credit  advanced,  the  information  on informal  credit  does  not
exist. Thus,  without  information  on informal  credit  it is  difficult  to
quantify  to  what extent  this  transition  in farmer's  source  of credit  from
private  to  government  haq  helped  increase  agricultural  investment,  output,
rural  employment  and  wages  in India.- 7  -
Nevertheless  with data  on formal  credit  it is possible  to quantify
its  effect  on agricultural  output  and investment.  Bur,  because  money  is
fungible  and farmers  also  get  loan  rem  the  private  lenders,  the  lack  of
information  on informal  credit  may influence  the  effects  of formal  credit
on output  and  investment.  However,  because  the  terms  of credit  in the
formal  system  are  better  than  from  money  lenders,  farmers  often  try  first
to satisfy  their  credit  demand  by approaching  the  formal  lending  agencies.
If they  fail  to satisfy  their  need  for  credit  they  then  perhaps  would
approach  the informal  lenders  at a  higher  rate  of interest. This suggests
that  the  absence  of information  regarding  informal  loans  may  not affect  the
estimates  of the  effects  of institutional  credit  (Feder  et.  al.,  1988).
The  credit  advanced  by formal  lending  agencies  is  an outcome  of
both the  supply  of and  demand  for  formal  credit. The  amount  of formal
credit  available  to farmer,  his  credit  rations.  enters  into  the  output
supply,  input  demand  (e.g.,  fertilizer,  employment)  and  wage functions  as
an independent  argument. 2 We,  therefore,  need  to disentangle  the  supply  of
formal  credit  from  its  demand. A two-stage  procedure  can  solve  this
identification  problem. Since  financial  institutions  decide  how  many
branches  or offices  a  district  should  have,  the  number  of offices  is
exogenous  to farmer  demand. In estimating  the  output  or input  effect  of
institutional  credit,  I  first  estimate  a credit  equation  with credit
advanced  as the  dependent  variable  with,  among  others,  the  uumber  of
branches  of financial  institutions  as explanatory  variables. This  provides
a  predicted  amount  of credit  supplied  to each  district  by formal  financial
intermediaries  which  is then  used in  the  second-stage  estimation  of output
supply  or input  demand  and  wage  equations.8 -
Formal  agricultural  lending  is  not  exogenously  given  or randomkly
distributed.  As discussed  in  Binswanger,  Khandker  and  Rosenzweig  (1988),
both the  farmers  and  financial  institutions  are influenced  by agricultural
opportunities  implied  in the  agroclimatic  endowments  of a district. That
means,  the  lending  agencies  will lend  more in  areas  where  agricultural
opportunities  are  better,  risk  is lower,  and  hence  loan  recovery  is  higher
(Binswanger  and  Rosenzweig,  1986). An unobserved  variable  problem  thus
arises  for  the  econometric  estimation  which  can  be overcome  by the  use  of
district-level  panel  data.
The  system  o' equations  to  be estimated  with the  district-level
time-series  data  are  the  followings
(1)  ICrit  - ICr(Xjt.  Zjt.  pjt.  6j)
(2)  Qjt  - Qjt(Xjt, ICrjt,  pit, d;)
(3)  INpjt  - INpjt(Xjt.  ICrjt,  Pjt. S)
(4)  INvjt  - INvjt(Xjt.  ICrjt.  INvj(t-l),  jSjt  6j)
(5)  WAGEjt  - WA7Ejt(Xjt,  ICrjt,  sit,  Sj)
where  equation  (1)  is the  district's  prediction  equation  for  institutional
credit  advanced  to rural  sector  by the  formal  lenders;  (2)  is  tbe  output
supply  equation;  (3)  is  the  input  dcmand  equation;  (4)  is the  investment
equation  and (5)  is  the  wage equation. Here  ICr  stands  for  institutional
credit  advanced,  X is  a vector  of exogenous  explanatory  variables  (e.g.,
the  output  and  input  prices,  government  infrastructure,  interaction  terms
between  year  and  agroclimatic  endowments,  the  rate  of interest);  Z is  a
vector  of the  number  of formal  lending  agencies;  Q is  aggregate  crop- 9  -
output;  INp  is the  level  of input  (fertilizer  and  employment)  utilized;  INv
stands  for  investment  in  pumps,  draft  animals,  milk  animals  and small
stocks;  WAGE is  daily  wage of  agricultural  workers;  A  is  vector  of
observable  district-specific  permanent  characteristics;  6  is  district-
specific  unobservable  characteristics  influencing  investment  and  output;  j
stands  for  district  and  t stands  for  time. The interaction  terms  between
year (t)  and  agroclimates  (tpj)  allow  for  a  district-specific  time  trend
which,  among  other  factors,  allows  for  district-specific  rate  of technical
change.
In order  to estimate  the  causal  relationships  between,  say,  output
growth  and  government  infrastructure  the  simultaneity  problem  arising  out
of the  response  of both  government  and farmers  to the  heterogenous  district
endowments  must be overcome. This is  done  by the  use  of panel  data  with
either  the  fixed  ur random  effects  technique. If the  unobserved  endowments
are time-invariant  and  specific  to  each  district,  then  a fixed  effects
procedure  is  appropriate. The  randoi  effects  procedure  accounts  for  the
existence  of both  time-invariant  and  time-varying  error  components. The
random  effects  procedure,  however,  ignores  any  correlation  between  the
persistent  errors  (endowment  effects)  and  time-varying  observed  variables.
We use  Hausman-Wu  specification  test  to determine  whether  the  fixed  or
random  effects  model  is  appropriate  for  the  given  data  and  present  results
accordingly.- 10  -
111.  Data and Vatriable  Description
The  data  used in  this  paper  are  drawn  from  85  districts  of India
for  a  period  of 9  years  beginning  from  1972/73  to  1980/81.  The  number  of
observations  vary  depending  on the  data  available  for  particular  dependent
variable. Thus,  765  observations  (9  years  x 85 districts)  are  used  for  the
output  supply  and  wage equations,  738 (9  year  x 82 districts)  observations
for  the  fertilizer  equation,  228 (3  years  x  76  districts)  observations  f
the  investment  equations,  and  only  170 (2  years  x 85 districts)
observations  for  the  farm  and  nonfarm  employment  equations. The  investment
data  are  computed  frc  livestock  censuses  of 1966,  1972,  1976  5nd  1982,
while  fertilizer,  crop  output,  and  wage data  are  from  yearly  fertilizer,
wage,  and  agricultural  statistics  published  by the  Ministry  of  Agriculture
of India. Crop  output  is the  aggregate  index  of 20 crops  using  1975/76  as
the  base  year,  fertilizer  is  measured  in  nutrient  tons  of  nitrogen,
phosphate  and  potash,  and  the  wage rate  is the  daily  wage rate  of
agricultural  field  workers. The  investment  variables  are  the  net  additions
over  each  census  interval  to the  stock  of draft  animals  (male  bullocks  and
male  buffalos),  milk animals  (female  bullocks  and female  buffalos),  small
stocks  (sheep  and  goats)  and  pumps  (both  diseal  and  electric). 3 Employment
data  are  dravn  from  the  population  censuses  of 1970  and  1980  which  are
comparable  with agricultural  census  years  of 1971  and  1981.  By employment
we mean  here  the  number  of persons  who  were employed  in farm  or  nonfarm
activities  for  atleast  183  mandays  in  one  year.
The  government  infrastructure  variables  include  road  length,
regulated  markets,  primary  school  density,  rural  electrification  and  canal
irrigation.  All the  infrastructure  and  dependent  variables  are  normalized- 11  -
by the  district's  size. The  price  variables  are  the  aggregate  price  index
based  on the internat 4onal  commodity  prices,  an all  India  price  index  of
fertilizer,  the  district-level  urban  wage income,  and  the  PACS  rate  of
interest. The  agroclimate  variables  include  annual  rainfall  and  permanent
characteristics  such  as soil  moisture  capacity,  length  of rainy  season,
exceesive  rainy  months,  irrigation  potential,  number  of cold  months  and
flood  potentials. For  a detailed  discussion  of these  variables  see
Binswanger,  Khandker  and  Rosenzweig,  (1988).
The  data  for  the  CBs  and  the  CCBs  are  published  by the  Reserve
Bank  of India  in Banking  Statistics.  The  National  Bank  for  Agriculture  and
Rural  Development  (NABARD)  of India  has  kindly  provided  unpublished  data  on
the  PACS  and  the  LDBs  which  were collected  by sending  questionnaires  to the
State  headquarters  of these  institutions. 4 Note  that  the  CCBs  primarily
advance  credit  to agriculture  via  lending  to  the  PACS  and  the  LDBs.  Thus,
rural  credit  is defined  in  this  paper  as the  amount  of institutiorial  credit
advanced  to the  rural  sector  by the  CBs  and the  credit  advanced  to
agriculture  by the  PACS  and  the  LDBs. Rural  credit  thus  reflects  both  the
subsidized  agricultural  credit  advanced  by the  PACS,  LDBs  and  CBs  and  non-
subsidized  nonagricultural  credit  advanced  by the  CBS.  The  variable  such
as subsidized  agricultural  credit  cannot  be constructed  because  district-
level  data  on  agricultural  credit  advanced  by the  CBs  are  not available.
Since  moiey  is fungible,  it is the  effect  of rural  credit  that  is  perhaps
important  to look  at.  However,  I report  the  effects  of credit  advanced  by
the  cooperative  sector  (i.e.,  PACS  and  LMBs)  to  compare  with those  of rural
credit  advanced  by the  banking  system  (i.e.,  PACS,  LDBs  and  CBs).  The  mean
and standard  deviation  of variables  involved  in this  paper  are  presented  in
table  1.- 12  -
IV.  The  Results
The  estimates  of the  credit  supply  equation  are  shown  in  table  2.
As the  Hausman-Wu  test  suggests,  the  fixed  effects  procedure  is  appropriate
to  explain  variations  in the  amount  of rural  credit  advanced. The real
urban  wage has  a negative  effect  on the  amount  of institutional  credit
advanced. An increase  in  urban  wage  which is  correlated  with the  urban
upswing  may tend  to  divert  credit  from  rural  to urban  sector. The roads
improvement  and  regulated  marketfi  development  have  positive  effects  on the
credit  amount  advanced  by the  lending  agencies  because  of the  induced
demand  effect  via their  positive  infrastructural  effects  on agricultural
output  and investment.  Rural  electrification  has  a negative  effect  on the
rural  loan  advanced  by government  agencies.
The  number  of branches  generally  have a  positive  effect  on the
volume  of institutional  credit  advanced  to rural  households. The  negative
effect  of PACS  on credit  supply  is  not surprising  given  the  reduction  in
the  PACS  associated  with consolidation  of primary  societies. Better
agroclimates  such  as  high irrigation  potential  and  high  soil  moisture
capacity  lead  to  higher  credit  use. Lending  is  also  higher  in  areas  with
low  flood  risk  as  measured  by flood  potential. In contrast,  the  credit
volumes  are  lower  in  areas  with longer  rainy  seasons.
Based  on the  estimates  of table  2,  we predict  the  amount  of credit
supplied  to  each  district  by formal  lending  agencies  each  year. Using  this
predicted  credit  amount  as an explanatory  variable,  among  others,  we then
estimate  the  fertilizer  demand  and  aggregate  output  supply  equations.
These  estimates  are  presented  in  table  3.  The  Hausman-Wu  test  suggests- 13 -
that  the  fixed  effects  procedure  is  appropriate  for  explaining  variations
in  both  the  fertilizer  demand  and  output  supply  over  time.
The  institutional  credit  has  a positive  effect  on  both the
fertilizer  demand  and  aggregate  output. A  10  percent  increase  in  the
formal  credit  leads  almost  3  percent  increase  in fertilizer  consumption  and
only  0.2  percent  in  aggregate  crop  output. The  output  effect  of credit  is
thus  fairly  low.  If  the  fertilizer  elasticity  of crop  output  is.  says
0.01,  it  appears  that  fertilizer  consumption  increased  by formal  credit
explains  more  than  the  increase  in  output  due  to  credit. The  fertilizer
price  has  a  negative  effect  on fertilizer  demand  indicating  a negative  own-
price  effect. However,  the  fertilizer  price  has  a  perverse  positive  effect
on  crop  output. The  urban  wage  has  a positive  effect  on both  the  output
and  fertilizer,  perhaps  indicating  a  positive  income  effect  induced  by
increased  urban  demand  for  farm  goods. Regulated  market  and  rural
electrification  have  a positive  effect  on both  the  fertilizer  demand  and
output  supply,  suggesting  a positive  induced  infrastructural  effect  on
agricultural  production.  Road  length,  however,  has  an  unexpected  negative
effect  on fertilizer  demand. Canal  irrigation  increases  fertilizer
consumption.  Better  agroclimates  such  as higher  rainfall,  high irrigation
potential  and  high soil  moisture  capacity  have  a positive  effect  on the
growth  in fertilizer  demand  and  output  supply. In  contrast,  poor
agroclimatic  conditions  such  as  excess  rain  have  a  negative  effect  on the
growth  of fertilizer  demand  and  hence  crop  output.
The investment  effect  of institutional  credit  on draft  and  milk
animals,  small  stocks  and  irrigation  pumps  is  shown  in  table  4.  The
Hausman-Wu  test  indicates  that  the  random  effects  model  is  more  appropriate-14  -
than  the  fixed  effects  in explaining  variations  in the  private  investment
over  time.  Institutional  credit  has  an overwhelming  positive  effect  on all
types  of private  agricultural  investment.  A  10  percent  increase  in the
amount  of institutional  credit  advanced  raises  private  investment  in
irrigation  pumps  by 4  percent,  6  percent  in  milk animals,  about  5  percent
in  draft  animals  and  almost  7 percent  in sheep  and  goats. The  credit
effect  of investment  is  thus  much  higher  than  its  effect  on fertilizer  use
and  aggregate  crop  output.
The  crop  output  price  has  an expected  positive  e^fect  on
investment  in  draft  animals,  small  stocks  and  irrigation  pumps,  indicating
a  positive  farm  profit  effect  on the  private  investment.  The  fertilizer
price  has  a  negative  effect  on  draft  animals  and  small  stocks,  while  a
positive  effect  on  milk animals. Real  urban  wage has  a  negative  effect  on
Investment  in  milk animals  and  small  stock. Real  urban  wage  has two
possible  effects:  one  is the  opportunity  cost  effect  of labor  and  the  other
is  an income  effect. The  results  suggest  that  the  opportunity  cost  of
human  labor  (negative)  is outweighed  by the  positive  income  effect  of urban
wage for  the  private  investment  in  draft  animals  and  pumps. The  road
investment  has  a  negative  effect  on investment  in  draft  and  milk animals,
indicating  that  private  investment  in  animals  reduces  as roads
communication  improves. Primary  school  expansion,  rural  electrification
and regulated  markets  have  expected  positive  effects  on private  investment
in some  capital  goods.
The  past stock  has  an expected  negative  effect  on current
investment,  because  of an adjustment  process  in an equilibrium  regime.
Private  investment  on pumps  and  small  stocks  increases  over time  in  wheat- 15  -
producing  areas  where  the  mean temperature  falls  below  18 degree  Farenheit.
In  contrast,  irrigation  potential  reduces  investment  in small  stocks  over
time. Better  agroclimates  such  as the  length  of rainy  season  encourage
private  investment  in  milk animals  over  time,  while  the  poor  agroclimates
such  as excess  rain  discourage  it.
The  effect  of formal  credit  on farm  and  nonfarm  employment  and
agricultural  real  wage is  shown  in  table  5.  The  Hausman-Wu  test  confirms
that  the  random  effect  model  is  more  appropriate  than  the  fixed  effect
model  in  explaining  variations  in  employment  and  wage over  time.
Institutional  credit  decreases  agricultural  employment  by increasing
private  capital  investment  in agriculture  that  replaces  farm  labor,  and  yet
increases  agricultural  real  wage  because  of its  strong  positive  effect  on
rural  nonfarm  employment.  A 10  percent  increase  in  institutional  credit
increases  nonfarm  employment  by almost  18  percent,  while  reduces  farm
employment  by only  0.4  percent  and  consequently  increases  agricultural  real
wage also  by 0.4  percent. As can  be seen  from  table  5,  rural
electrification  like  formal  credit  reallocates  labor  from  agriculture  to
rural  nonagricultural  activities  and  thus  helps  increase  agricultural  real
wage.
In  contrast,  the  aggregate  crop  output  price  increases  both  the
farm  and  rural  nonfarm  employment  and  hence  agricultural  real  wage.  Real
urban  wage  has a  negative  effect  on farm  employment  but  a positive  effect
on agricultural  real  wage because  of its  demand-pull  effect  on the  rural
sector. Regulated  market  and  primary  school  expansion  have  a negative
effect  on  both  the  rural  nonfarm  employment  and  agricultural  real  wage,
although  they  have  a  positive  effect  on  farm  employment.  A  10  percent- 16  -
increase  in the  rural  market  regulation  increases  farm  employment  by only  6
percent,  but  decreases  rural  nonfarm  employment  by almost  10  percent  and
consequently  agricultural  real  wage  by about  6 percent.
Better  agroclimates  such  as  higher  annual  rainfall  and  irrigation
potential  increases  agricultural  real  wage and  employment. 5 In contrast,
farm  employment  has declined  over  time  in  wheat  producing  areas  where  the
number  of cool  months  (i.e.,  when the  mean temperature  falls  below  18
degree  Farenheit)  is  higher.
The summary  results  of the  effect  of rural  credit,  cooperative
credit  and  number  of commercial  bank  branches  on agricultural  output,
investment,  wage and  rural  employment  are  presented  in table  6.  As this
table  suggests,  the  results  do  not  differ  substantially  whether  number  of
commercial  bank  branches  or  volume  of rural  lending  or volume  of
cooperative  lending  is  used.  More  bank  branches  and  more credit  (either
agricultural  or  nonagricultural)  increase  agricultural  output  with  an
elasticity  of about  0.02,  and  fertilizer  use  with an elasticity  in  the
range  of  0.1-0.3.  They lead  to  higher  investment  in tractors,  pumps,  draft
animals  and  small  stocks,  with investment  elasticities  of between  0.14  to
0.71. Although  cooperative  credit  seems  to  have  no significant  effect  on
rural  employment  and  wages,  commercial  bank  branches  and  rural  credit  have
significant  impact  on these  outcomes. For  example,  they  increase  rural
nonfarm  employment  with  an elasticity  of 0.2  to 0.3,  while  higher  bank
branches  decrease  agricultural  employment  with an elasticity  of 0.07.
Nevertheless  banking  expansion  or formal  credit  expansion  increase
agricultural  real  wage  with an elasticity  in  the  range  of 0.04  to 0.06.- 17 -
V. Conclusions
This  paper  has estimated  the  effect  of institutional  credit  on
agricultural  output,  investment,  fertilizer  demand,  farm-nonfarm  employment
and  real  wage  using  district-level  panel  da.a  from  India. In India  special
credit  programs  were launched  after  the  nationalization  of commercial  banks
in 1969  to support  the  country's  green  revolution  in  agriculture.  An
important  policy  quesu.Jon  thus  emerges:  to  what extent  low-interest
insitutioi  l credit  has  helped  increase  private  investment  and  output  in
Indian  agriculture  and  consequently  rural  employment  and  wage.
A panel  data  analysis  is  used  to estimate  the  output  and input
effect  as  well as  wage effect  of formal  credit. The  number  of branches  of
lending  agencies  are  determined  by  the  financial  intermcdiaries  and  thus
exogenous  to  farmer  demand  for  credit.  They  can,  therefore,  be  used  as
instruments  to  identify  the  aggregate  supply  of formal  credit  from  its
demand.  These  instruments  also  help  solve  the  simultaneity  between  the
credit  supply,  output  supply,  input  demand  and  wage equations. By using
panel  data  we circumvent  the  unobserved  variable  problem  that  could
otherwise  produce  inconsistent  estimates  in cross-section  data  analysis.
Econometric  estimates  suggest  that  formal  credit  plays  an
important  role  in fertilizer  demand,  private  fixed  investment,  crop  output,
farm-nonfarm  employment  and  agricultural  real  wage in India. A  10 percent
increase  in  formal  credit  supply  increases  fertilizer  use  by  almost  3
percent.  A  similar  percentage  increase  in the  supply  of  institutional
credit  spurs  a 4  percent  increase  in  private  investment  in irrigation
pumps,  5 percent  each in  draft  animals,  6 percent  in  milk  animals,  and- 18  _
about  7  percent  in small  stocks. In contrast,  a 10 percent  increase  in
formal  credit  supply  increases  aggregate  crop  output  by only  0.2  percent.
Compared  to the  credit  effect  of investment  and fertilizer  demand,  the  crop
output  effect  appears  fairly  small. Since  increased  fertilizer  consumption
induced  by formal  credit  can  explain  more than  the  credit  effect  of output,
it appears,  therefore,  that  additional  capital  investment  has  worked  more
for substituting  agricultural  labor  than  for  increasing  crop  output. Thus,
a 10 percent  increase  in the  formal  credit  has reduced  agricultural
employment  by 0.4  percent. However,  institutional  credit  has a  modest
positive  effect  on  agricultural  real  wage.  This is  because  it  has created
more jobs  in the  rural  nonfarm  activities  than  it  has substracted  in
agriculture.  For  example,  a 10  percent  increase  in formal  credit  increases
rural  nonfarm  employment  by almost  18  percent  and  agricultural  real  wage by
0.4  percent. Formal  credit  expansion  in  rural  India,  therefore,  has  had a
major  effect  on rural  nonfarm  sector  and  a  modest  effect  in  agriculture
despite  the  considerable  directed  policy  to increase  formal  credit  supply
for  agriculture. Finally,  the  results  do  not  vary substantially  whether
one  uses the  number  of commercial  bank  branches  or volume  of lending  (rural
or agricultural)  as a  measure  of growth  of rural  financial  intermediation.- 19  -
Footuotes
It is  worth  noting  that  the  CBs  who advance  more rural  credit
than  the  PACS  and  the  LDBs.  For  example,  RBI  reports  that  in 1981
the  CBs  advanced  776.3  billion  rupees  to the  rural  sector,  while
the  coopearive  sector  (i.e.,  PACS  and  LDBs)  advanced  only  236.7
billion  rupees,  a third  of  what the  CBs  advanced.
2  Credit  can  enter  into  the  output  supply  and  hence  input  demand  and
investment  or  wage functions  if  credit  is a  binding  constraint  in
rural  household's  input-output  decision-making.  Assume  that  a
farmer  maximizes  output  function,  Q - Ka  (i)
subject  to a liquidity  constraint,
rx - 5  (ii),
where  Q is  crop  output,  K is  fixed  capital  such  as livestock  and
irrigation  pumps,  r is the  price  of  variable  inputs  (X)  such  as
labor and fertilizer,  6  is the total credit available to purchase
variable  inputs;  and  equation  (i)  is  the  familiar  Cobb-Douglas
production  function. By simple  manipulation,  one  can  derive  the
input  demand-equation  as
Xc,  r_ 1 6  (iil)
and  the  output  supply  equation  as
,  QC( - r-PP  (iv)
where  Xc and  Qc are,  respectively,  credit-constrained  level  of
input  use  and  crop  output. If competitive  labor  market  exists  and
equilibrium  condition  is satisfied,  one  can  also  show  agricultural
wage as a function  of credit  ration  available  to the  farmers.- 20 -
3  A  second-stage  equation  for  tractors  could  not  be estimated
because  none  of the  explanatory  variables  has  a  significant  effect
on the  tractors  investment. Thus,  the  tractor  variable  was
dropped.
4  Thanks  to Dr.  Gad&Ll  of NABARD  who  has  kindly  opened  the  data  base
and  personally  organized  the  assembly  of the  unpublished  banking
data. This  paper  would  not  have  been  feasible  without  his  kind
help in  collecting  the  banking  data.
Since  employment  equations  represent  occupational  status  of rural
households  over the  decade  of 1970,  the  annual  rainfall  variable
does  not enter  into  these  equations. This  is,  however,  not the
case  with agricultural  wage  which  comes  from  annual  data.- 21 -
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TANLE  1. DESCRIPT?M  STAT!ST!CS
DeDendent  Variable  Number  of  Mean  Standard
ObFW  rvatons  doviation
Aggregate  crop  output  index  785  1.38S  1.168
Fertilizer  zonsumption,  nutrient  tona/
10  sq.  km.  788  23.784  30.997
Not  investment  in  draft  animalo,  number/
10  eq.  km.  223  6.756  17.102
Net  Investment  In  milk  ani"als,  number/
10  sq.  km.  228  17.974  27.691
Not  investment  In snall  stocks,  number/
10 sq. km.  228  5.948  16.426
Net Investment in  pumps, nunber/
10  sq. km/  228  1.846  2.034
Credit  advanced  to  rural  aector,
'000  Rs./  10  sq. km.  765  283.991  421.446
Cooperative  credit  advanced  to  agriculture  765  9a.616  203.583
Agricultural  real  wage
(Re.  /an day)  765  5.294  2.165
Agricultural  employment,
persons/10  sq. km  170  236.492  196.889
Nonagricultural  employmnt,
persons/10  sq. km  170  153.989  206.158
Independent  Variable
Aggregate  roal  crop  price  Index  766  0.861  0.328
Real price ot  fertilizer  766  8.459  0.493
Annual  urban  wage  (real)  785  4373.277  1406.924
Canal  irrigation,  '000  ho/10  sq.  km.  765  0.0  8  0.101
Number  of  regulated  markete/
10  sq. km.  765  0.019  0.026- 24  -
Independent  Vegiable  Number  of  Mean  Standard
Observattone  d-vivtion
Number  of  villagea  with  primary
school/10  sq.  km.  765  1.289  0.668
Number  of  village  with  *lectricity/
10  sq.  km.  765  0.976  0.865
Total  road  length/10  sq.  km.  7?6  5.369  4.986
Number  of  rural  and a*il-urban  branches
of  commrcial  banks/10  eq. km.  765  0.101  0.132
Number  of  cooperative  bank branches/
10 q.  kM.  765  0.031  0.026
Number  of  agricultural  co-operative
societloe/10  sq.  km.  765  0.436  0.277
Number  of  land  development  banks/
10  sq.  km.  766  0.010  0.006
Annual  rainfall  in  _  765  1120.059  9S4.609
Soil  molture  capacity  Index  a6  2.349  1.01
Length  of  rainy  *"noon,  onths  86  8.653  1.868
Excess  rainy  months,  number  a6  1.236  1.394
Number  of  cold  months  e6  0.935  1.313
Percentage  of  area  liable  to  flooding  e6  1.389  3.532
Percentage  of  aroa  potential  for
Irrigation  85  S0.001  31.909- 25 -
TAKE t.  EKTER  ANTS  OF  INMUTONAL  C1EDT  ADVANE  TO  R3AL SECTOR
Exolanetorv  varlable  Institutional  Credit
(FI  xed  Effet.)
Aggregate real  crop  (real)  price  (Iaged)  -0.064  (-0.841)
Real price  of  fortilizoer  -0.249  (-1.008)
Real urban wago  -0.a2a  (-2.828)o
Rainfall  x 1O0  1.6894  (0.724)
Roadns  2.489  (5.523).
Rogulated mrketae  0.490  (8.254)*
Primry  *chooln'  0.984  (1.328)
Rural *lectrificationa  -0.a68  (-1.925).
Canal irrlgationa  -0.278  (-1.S8C)
Commercial  bankna  0.861  (9.185).
Cooperative Bankaa  0.259  (2.1)36)o
Primry  cooperative  socletiesa  -0.81S  (-4.499)*
Land developmnt  bankus  -0.228  (-1.467)
Year  -0.003  (-0.027)
Year x  Irrigation  potential  0.847  (2.873)*
Year  x  excess  rain  months  0.883  (0.265)
Year  x  length of  rainy  soason  -6.942  (-2.563)e
Year  x *oil  molsture capacity  7.029  (2.473)*
Year  x flood  potential  -1.9S4  (-1.990)*
Ye-r  x no.  of  cold months  -. 8.59  (-1.339)
F-Statistic  44.62
Housman-Wu  (chl-square,  20 df.)  42.6
Number  of  observatipns  765
Note:  t-statistic  are, In parenthesee.  Asterisk  rofers  to  significance  level
of  10 percent or  better.
a  coefficienta  are In  elasticity  form.- 26  -
TABLE  S. EFMC_  OF  KSIMIUTUNAL  OMEIT  ON  FERTIlUZER
CONSUWTIN  AND  AGRICtINJAL  OUTPUT
Explanatory  Variable  Fertilizer  Consumption  Acareasto Crop Output
Institutional  credit  (predicted)a  0.2865  0.021
(6.949)o  (1.  344)§
Aggregate  real  output  price  0.05U  0.012
index  (lagged)'  (1.128)  (0.414)
Real  price  of  fertilizers  -0.506  0.114
(-4.041).  (1.660)* Real urban wage  0.185  0.131
(2.917)*  (3.124)*
Rogulated  market  0.249  0.091
(3.111)e  (2.223)-
Canal  irrigatlona  0.289  -0.078
(2.446).  (-1.389)
Rurol  *l  etrificationa  0.242  0.060
(2.710)o  (1.031)
Road  length*  -0.727  -0.140
(-2.862).  (-1.022)
Primary  schoola  0.68S  0.219
(1.626)  (1.066)
Annual  rainfall  x  103  1.008  1.078
(1.081)  (3.778)*
Year  -2.951  -0.000
(-4.496)*  (-0.021)
Yoar  x irrigation  potential  0.022  0.001
(3.858)*  (5.618)*
Year  x *xcees  rain  -0.677  -0.003
(-4.733)*  (-1.628)
Year  x  soil  moisture capacity  0.6e  0.008
(4.087).  (2.262)*
Year  x  length of  rainy  season  0.869  -0.008
(2.566)*  (-2.810)*
Year x  flood  potential  -0.022  -0.001
(-0.616)  (-0.988)
Year  x  no.  of  cold  months  0.560  0.001
(3.411)-  (0.142)
F-Statistic  60.446  19.99
Hausman-Wu  (chl-square,  17 df.)  36.974  34.098
Number  of  observations  738  765
Note:  .t-statistices  no  in  parentheses.  Asterisk  refers  to  significance
iev-l  of  10  percent  or  better  on a two-tall  test.
a  coofficients  are  in  elasticity  form.
§ refers  to  a 10  percent  level  of  significance  on  a  one-tail  test.- 27 -
TAILe  4. EFFECT  OF  INSTrITTlONAL  CREDIT  ON  AGRICULTURAL  INVESTMENT
(No.  of  Obeervatlonc  a  22,)
Investment  In
Exolanatory  Draft  Milk
verinbl-  animalcs  'nials  Small  stocks  Pumps
Institutional  credit  0.488  0.140  o.67'  0.444
(predicted)&  (2.229).  (6.189).  (2.822)*  (3.908)*
Aggrgat.  real  crop  output  2.844  0.017  1.432  0.395
price,  lagged  (3.288).  (0.042)  (1.860)*  (1.742)*
Real  fertllizer  price  a  -14.291  -11.953  -19.819  0.135
(-5.004).  (7.682)*  (-4.569)*  (0.093)
Real  urban  wage  a  0.076  -1.052  -3.939  0.037
(0.068)  (-1.718).  (-4.668).  (0.066)
Road a  -1.621  -1.789  1.205  -0.265
(-1.839).  (-3.363).  (1.165)  (-0.669)
Canal  Irrigation  a  -0.679  -0.190  0.008  -0.312
(-1.001)  (-0.517)  (0.011)  (-0.977)
Primary  schools  a  6.477  -0.670  0.489  0.121
(3.706)*  (-0.639)  (0.242)  (0.132)
Electriflcation  0.28s  0.406  -0.754  0.231
(0.727)  (1.826)*  (-1.774).  (1.129)
Regulated  uarkotsa  -0.094  0.396  0.279  -0.023
(-0.218)  (1.643)*  (0.589)  (-0.104)
Rainfall  x  103 2.376  22.89s  -S.986  0.732
(0.477)  (2.8W)*  (-1.138)  (1.097)
Past  stock  -0.239  -0.041  -0.20S  -0.100
(-14.693)*  (-0.901)  (-14.260)*  (-9.543)*
Year  -0.499  2.971  1.367  0.002
(-0.807)  (2.894)*  (2.061)*  (0.020)
Year x cool  months  0.105  -0.137  0.486  0.026
(1.434)  (-0.904)  (4.913)*  (2.319)*
Year  x  rainy  *seon  0.091  0.691  0.119  0.003
(0.965)  (3.709).  (0.960)  (0.189)
Year  x  flood  potential  -0.006  0.036  0.095  0.002
(-0.193)  (0.669)  (2.316)s  (0.496)
Year  x lrrigation  0.006  0.002  -0.015  -0.001
potential  (1.424)  (0.216)  (-3.087)*  (-0.103)
Year  x  Soil  moisture  (-0.041)  -0.239  -0.116  -0.008
capacity  (-0.460)  (-1.332)  (-0.967)  (-0.634)
Year  x  excess  rain  0.101  -0.419  -0.168  -0.006
months  (1.273)  (-2.601)*  (-1.464)  (.4.390)
Constant  120.182  -75.226  106.846  0.426
(3.173)*  (-1.286)  (2.896)*  (0.089)
F-Statistic  23.440  30.939  19.6s8  6.988
Hausmn-Wu
(Chi-square,  18  df)  14.196  17.891  20.Sie  13.888
Notes:  t-Statistics  are  in  parenthesis.  Asterisk  refors  to  significance
level  of  10  percent  or  better  on  a two-tail  test.
a Coefficiente  of  thes  variables  are  In  elasticity  fore.- 28  -
TABLE  S.  EFFECT  OF INSTITUTONAL  CREDrT  ON  FARM ND NONFARM
EWPLOYMIBT  AND  ACRICULilRAL  WAGE
Explanatory  Varlablo  Nonfarm  Form  Agricultural
employment  employment  waG9
Institutional  credit  (prodicted)*  0.176  -0.044  0.040
(5.789).  (-1.881)*  (2.709)*
Aggregate  re-l  crop  output  price  0.141  0.114  0.038
index  (lagged)"  (1.831)§  (2.642)*  (1.624)*
Real  prico  of  fertilizora  0.420  0.08  0.01
(0.979)  (0.207)  (0.868)
Real  urban  wagea  -0.049  -0.208  0.394
(-0.289)  (-1.589)  (11.738)*
Regulated  markot  -0.098  0.057  -0.059
(-2.091)*  (1.628).  (-1.829)o
Canal  irrigationa  0.064  -0.088  -0.046
(0.661)  (-1.868)  (-1.106)
Rural  *loctrificationa  0.1B8  -0.058  0.061
(3.428)*  (-1.966).  (1.512)§
Road  lengtha  0.168  0.003  -0.174
(1.142)  (0.656)  (-1.889).
Primry  echoolO  -0.607  0.134  -0.261
(-3.251).  (0.933)  (-1.766)*
Annual  rainfall  x  10o  0.272
-- (2.817)a
Year  0.061  0.725  0.025
(0.044)  (-0.411)  (0.679
Year  x  Irrigation  potential  0.001  0.044  0.001
(0.069)  (3.163).  (1.642)*
Year  x  excess  rain  months  0.888  -0.619  0.007
(3.265)e  (-1.494)  (1.039)
Yer  x  soil moisture  capacity  -0.455  0.289  -0.008
(-1.729)*  (0.841)  (-1.200)
Year  x length  of rainy samon  0.318  0.853  0.003
(1.020)  (2.104)*  (0.358)
Year  x  flood  potential  0.021  0.164  -0.001
(0.248)  (1.439)  (-0.286)
Year  x  no.  of  cold  months  0.286  -0.878  0.004
(1.211)  (-2.209).  (0.683)
F-Statistic  29.686  10.945  28.822
HNusman-Wu  (chi-square)  14.965  18.428  16.439
Number of  observations  170  170  765
Note:  t-statistics  are  In  parentheses.  Asterisk  refers  to significance
levol  of  10 percent  or better  on  a  two-tail  teat.
a  coefficients  are  In  elasticity  form.
§ refers  to  a  10 percent  level  of  significance  on  a one-tall  test.PPR  Wnrklng  PEr  Serbes
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